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The unresolved scholarly debate to curtail cost and time performances in projects has led to 
alternate solutions, departing from the dominant technical school of thought to include concepts 
from behavioural sciences. In this paper, we consider the psychological effect, namely optimism 
bias, as one of the root causes for delays in cost overruns on projects. The research objectives were 
to determine the level of bias among project participants, rank time and cost overrun causes 
according to the participants’ bias score and establish a mitigation strategy to curb potential delays 
and cost overrun impacts based on the bias scores obtained. A literature survey was conducted to 
determine causal factors contributing to delays and cost overruns linked to optimism bias. Through 
a pilot survey of three semi-structured interviews, eighty factors obtained from the literature 
survey were reduced to 24 critical delay and cost overrun factors relevant to Trinidad and Tobago. 
A questionnaire was subsequently developed seeking construction professionals to rate their bias 
scores based on an 11-point Likert scale. The research confirms that project planners and decision-
makers exhibit moderate levels of optimism bias; however, participants lacked awareness of the 
impact of optimism bias on projects outcomes. Project location, environmental impacts and 
historic preservation, and labour disputes are the top three critical factors where project 
professionals displayed increased optimistic tendencies. It is proposed that contingency “time 
window” and reference class forecasting be implemented as control mechanisms to mitigate the 
impacts of time and cost overruns on projects. This research introduces a novel method to account 
for and measure optimism bias on construction projects. This study adds knowledge into delays 
and cost overruns causation and provides a foundation for future studies on quantifying 
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The inability to accurately forecast construction project costs and time parameters continues to be a worldwide 
phenomenon and consequently hinders their successful completion. The underlying reasons for these delays and cost 
overruns vary vastly based on stakeholders’ viewpoints such as, but not limited to, geography, economic conditions, 
technical competency, and governance structures. Similarly, such delays have been noted to be disruptive and expensive 
[1]. Sinnette [2] uncovered that approximately half of the active projects sampled experienced cost overruns. In the UK, 
the Taxpayer's Alliance [3] surveyed 305 projects and reported that these projects exceeded initial budgetary allocations 
by about one-third. Issues based on impractical baseline planning [4], uncertainty and optimism bias [5] have not been 
accounted for by decision-makers. Inevitably, design errors and omissions, construction mistakes, and contractual 
conflicts are but a few negative outcomes accepted as a norm in the construction industry [6].  
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The propensity to be “overly positive” when forecasting and planning tasks is viewed as optimism bias [7]. Lovallo 
and Kahneman [8] discovered optimism bias within individuals to overestimate their ability to identify and manage 
risks. Similar forms of overconfidence have been reported in organisational dynamics [4], and locking-in-undelivered 
goals [9], subsequently affecting practices such as handling of information, management, and effective communication 
[10]. Ultimately, without recognising and accounting for optimism bias risk, decisions made are based on project actors’ 
heuristics [11]. These decisions can negatively impact time and costs, limiting the overall productivity and performance 
of a project.  
Research on cost overruns progresses along two distinct schools of thought (SOT). The deterministic or empirical 
school [12-15] evolved from investigating the planning and managing of projects that focus on a rational outcome for 
cost overruns through performance metrics use and their shortfalls. This empirical school established rationalistic logic-
based planning, formal processes, and analytical techniques for forecasting future outcomes, but with the constraint of 
avoiding uncertainty in order to achieve certainty despite engaging the subjective human element. As a result, the 
behavioural school of thought in cost overrun research developed [7, 16-18] along with the assumption that the root 
cause of cost overruns is delusion, which is based on the project actors' individual biases and strategic misrepresentation 
(the deliberate intent to deceive in order to gain project acceptance). While it is acknowledged that cost overruns are a 
widespread issue and have garnered considerable interest from stakeholders, the proposed solutions are limited without 
understanding where this tendency is most pronounced in projects. Although scholarly works on delays and cost 
overruns abound, it is unclear at the moment how cost overrun is defined, why it occurs, or how to best circumvent it 
[19]. This gap warrants the need to investigate the psychological effects/tendencies of decision-makers influence on 
projects. Additionally, there are few attempts to quantify the degree of optimism bias among project planners and 
decision-makers in the construction sector, and there are no studies documenting small island Caribbean. Until now, 
little research has been conducted on the psychological factors influencing project actors' optimal decision-making 
abilities in construction, necessitating and justifying the need for further research. 
This research aims to quantify the level of optimism bias inherent to project participants in Trinidad and Tobago’s 
construction industry through the theoretical lens of uncertainty and indeterminateness. To achieve this, the study will 
investigate the relationship between optimism bias and time and cost overruns in construction management processes. 
The research focused on three objectives, namely, to determine the level of bias among project participants, to rank time 
and cost overrun causes according to the participants’ bias score and to establish a mitigation strategy using “contingency 
time windows” built into a schedule where delays beyond the control of the project team are expected to occur in public 
sector projects. As a result, this research introduces a method by which optimism bias can be measured and accounted 
for in the construction sector. 
2- Literature Review 
A delay event, traditionally described as an event yielding an overrun in allocated time beyond a planned completion 
date contracting parties agreed for project delivery [20], can result in cost overruns [21]. Although there is no one 
universal definition for cost overruns [22], this research aligns with the interpretation by Ahiaga-Dagbui, et al. [12] as 
“the difference between project completion cost and budgeted cost at project approval”. Cost overruns are influenced 
by variables within the political, social, technical, and psychological root causes [19]. Political root causes are 
exemplified where planners and promoters of projects intentionally overestimate benefits and underestimate the cost of 
increasing the viability of a project’s acceptance and approval [23, 24]. This strategic misrepresentation [25] leads to 
inferior projects accepted with higher risks of contracted time and budget overruns, with failed promised benefits. These 
dishonest practices emanate directly from organisational pressure along with political interference [24], with the 
intentional mind-set to deceive [26] tantamount to fraudulent misrepresentation such as bid-rigging and collusion [27, 
28]. Other main political factors such as hostile political conditions, weak project organisational structures[29], lack of 
consensus, bureaucracy and interagency conflict, contractual relationships, and manipulation of information [1, 30-33] 
contribute to time and cost overruns.  
Technical root causes such as errors in project design, omissions in project documentation and procurement selection 
[34, 35] manifest as variations in projects, typically encountered as errors or bill of quantities under measurement, and 
changes in design [36]. Hickson and Ellis [37] stated that such technical factors affect the productivity of projects within 
Trinidad and Tobago. Similarly, technical factors which were found to be major contributors to delays and cost overruns 
prior to the commencement of construction activities are clarity of technical specifications and poor tendering documents 
[39], poor planning among stakeholders [40], and client’s decision making processes [15]. During construction, change 
orders [14], construction methods [38], quality of equipment and machinery supply [41] and the lack of specialised 
workers and competency [42]. Social root causes emanate from the influence of society [43] which contribute to project 
delays and cost overruns. Additional social factors include community and local involvement, labour strikes [43], protest 
against excessive noise from work, environmental restrictions and impact [33] and historic preservation [44]. 
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More recently, project studies have linked psychological influences, particularly optimism bias, as a dominant root 
cause contributing to cost and schedule overruns [45]. Psychological factors, or factors related to both the mental and 
emotional state of an individual [46], can lead to biases in judgement, such as ambiguity effects, anchoring, planning 
fallacy, and optimism, which negatively influence human judgements [47]. Optimism Bias is recognised in decision 
making on projects through the predisposition for “overly positive” predictions in forecasting or planning outcomes [7]. 
Thus success measures and benefits are overestimated unintentionally, as opposed to strategic misrepresentation. Time 
overruns on projects based on optimism bias result from a phenomenon known as the planning fallacy [48]. Regardless 
of the actual performance of previous similar projects, the tendency of the project planner to ignore distributional 
information, knowledge and experiences, and underestimate one’s tasks and schedules, is the manifestation of optimism 
bias when similar tasks and schedules are actually longer in duration. The planning fallacy also states that individuals 
display a level of pessimism bias when predicting or observing others’ tasks and plans, generally overestimating the 
actual duration. To overcome such cognitive bias, project decision-makers rely on heuristics or mental shortcuts to make 
judgements and decisions [49]. There are pros and cons to the use of heuristics in projects. Limitations of resources and 
information, and uncertainty and/or complexity of the problem require astute problem-solving skills and quick decision 
making [50] as time is often a constraint, but even informed practitioners are prone to severe mistakes in judgement 
[11]. Overreliance on these mental shortcuts can, without informed awareness, can circumvent critical analysis and 
hinder decision making [51]. A detailed listing of 81 causal factors contributing to both delays and cost overruns were 
extracted from the literature review. These factors were categorised into the leading root causes as shown in Table 1.   
Table 1. Compiled list of factors contributing to delays and cost overruns. 
Technical Factors 
1. Design changes during construction 
2. Non-performance of the contractors 
3. Under-measurement in the BOQ 
4. Increase/finalising in the cost of specialist items 
5. Very slow response from utilities agencies 
6. Delay in issues and provision of design and structural drawings 
(including approval) 
7. Delay due to weather conditions. 
8. Discrepancies between in BOQ and drawings 
9. Delay due to site location/layout. 
10. Shortage of experienced labour 
11. Under measurement in BOQ and additional work  
12. deficient site management 
13. Change in contractor 
14. Price escalation 
15. Material (Shortage) and equipment availability 
16. slope failure 
17. Site restriction access 
18. inexperienced design personnel  
19. logistical errors, programme, deficiencies, defective work 
20. Poor communication and relationship with nominated sub-
contractors  
21. Lack of labour supervision 
22. Delay in responding to request for information. 
23. Late arrival, early quit and unscheduled breaks 
24. Payment delay/Lack of funding 
25. Construction method 
26. Clarity of technical specifications 
27. Coordination level among design disciplines 
28. Lack of incentive scheme 
29. Crew size and composition 
30. Sequencing problems 
31. Compatibility and consistency among contract documents 
32. Stringent inspection by the engineer 
Political Factors 
43. Owner's representative intervention with site management and 
operatives 
44. Hostile political conditions 
45. Delay in approval of completed work by client 
46. Obtaining permission from local authorities 
47. A poor organisational structure for client or consultant 
48. Changes in government regulations and laws 
49. Poor means of contracting. 
50. Conflict between owners and other parties 
51. Poor coordination among parties 
52. Improper planning during the bidding stage 
53. Low priority by the state 
54. Poor consultant work 
55. local controversy 
56. Regulations (lawsuits) 
57. Stakeholder and local opposition 
58. Lack of consensus (Insufficient political support) 
59. finding an effective public sector champion  
60. Laws and regulations empowering community groups 
61. bureaucracy and interagency conflict 
62. Government's tendency to maximize its budget and hide the true cost. 
63. Manipulation of information 
64. Contractual relationship (Contract modification/ Negotiation of 
obtaining contract, poor contract management etc.) 
Psychological Factors 
65. Unrealistic scheduling and expectation of labour 
66. Motivation for labour 
67. Lack of periodical meetings with crew leaders 
68. Unrealistic inspection and testing methods proposed in contract 
69. Consultant or architect's reluctance for change 
70. High level of uncertainty  
71. Raising false expectations 
72. short-term thinking and tactical delays 
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33. Inspection delay by site management/Engineer 
34. Accidents from poor site safety program 
35. Design complexity level/increase in work scope 
36. A faulty soil investigation report 
37. Slow decision making 
38. Slow delivery in the supply of material 
39. Unforeseen ground condition 
40. Delay in handing over the site 
41. Frequent change in subcontractor 
42. Lack of database of estimates (duration and resources) 
Social Factors 
73. Disruption to the contractor's schedule because of the close proximity 
of existing schools 
74. Interruption by locals demanding employment. 
75. Protest against excessive noise from work 
76. Environmental restrictions (excessive noise) 
77. Theft and vandalism of materials 
78. Labour interference and congestion 
79. historic preservation consultation 
80. Environmental impacts (fish/wildlife/endangered species issues, 
wetlands) 
81. Labour disputes and strikes 
In developed nations such as the United Kingdom, HM Treasury [9] recognised the inherent nature of optimism bias 
by professionals in estimating key project parameters such as capital and operating costs, duration and the intended 
delivery of benefits by the project. Public sector professionals are now mandated to account for optimism bias, 
documented in the revision to “The Green Book” [9]. Mitigation strategies such as Reference Class Forecasting and due 
diligence processes [45] are proposed as countermeasures to curb optimism bias during project planning. However, Son 
and Rojas [4] and Shelbourn et al. [10] observed the continued prevalence of optimism bias within organisational 
dynamics; its impact on stakeholders, communication, and information handling depends on the size and complexity of 
projects. Moreover, modern construction techniques and procedures are void of failsafe measures such as “plan 
reliability” [52] to prevent optimism bias influencing the critical path and productivity during project planning and 
construction management.  
According to the literature, there are sufficient studies accounting for optimism bias and its impact, but few quantify 
this phenomenon or ascribe a degree of importance to specific factors. Consequently, the central question explored is 
whether optimism bias is overlooked in construction management by planners and decision-makers? To address this 
knowledge gap, this research uses two sub-questions to examine the prevalence of optimism bias among public sector 
project professionals in Trinidad and Tobago, a Caribbean SIDS. 
R.Q.1 What are the main delay and cost overrun factors project decision-makers tend to exert bias based on optimism? 
R.Q.2 How can a bias score be assigned to project decision-makers to determine optimism or pessimism?  
3- Research Methodology 
The research method followed a three-stage process. The literature review stage allowed for the compilation of a 
comprehensive list of 81 delay factors in building construction projects linked to optimism bias. The second stage was 
a pilot survey involving three experts in the project management and construction management fields with knowledge 
of optimism bias in the construction sector. This pilot survey engaged the experts in an open discussion on the influence 
of optimism in the Caribbean and the relevant delay factors typically influenced by optimism bias. These semi-structured 
interviews resulted in a list of 24 delay factors that could be relatable within the SIDS’s construction context. [36, 37].  
The final stage involved the development of a questionnaire survey consisting of three sections. The first section 
requested demographic inputs, namely gender, years of experience, age and job position. Section two contains the 24 
delay factors group under the main headings of political, technical, social, and psychological root causes. To determine 
an optimism bias score, the direct method approach was adopted, modelled along Heine and Lehman [53], and Breakwell 
et al. [54] methods. Theoretically, the direct approach method yields a strong optimism bias effect compared to the 
indirect method approach. The direct approach utilized an 11-point Likert scale, with numbers ranging from -5 to 5, as 
it increased the probability of establishing optimism bias among individuals [54]. Participants were asked to rate the 
likelihood of the delay events, both negative and positive occurring. Based on the scores assigned, a "bias score" was 
obtained. “-5” is very much lower than the average project manager’s probability, “0” represents both equal probabilities, 
and “5” represent a very much higher than the average project manager’s probability. Section three consisted of eight 
questions, two of which were open-ended, with the aim of gathering details in identifying optimism bias and possible 
mitigation strategies. A hundred and five questionnaires were administered to the targeted public sector project 
participants. In total, 53 responses were received with a 52% return rate, which exceeded the Moser and Kalton [55] 
minimum return rate of less than 40%, which is considered bias and of insufficient importance. Figure 1 provides a 
flowchart of the research approach undertaken for this study. 
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Figure 1. Flowchart of research activities. 
3-1- Reliability and Validity 
The reliability of the scale used to measure optimism bias among participants in the construction industry was 
determined using Cronbach’s α index. The value of α is contingent on the number of variables within the questionnaire 
and the correlations between them. An α of 0.8 and greater is considered reliable [56, 57]. Statistical Package for Social 
Science (SPSS®) software was used to analyse the survey results. An α value of 0.895 (89.5% scale reliability) was 
obtained, confirming the reliability and internal consistency of the scales. The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (examines 
the interdependency of the subscales) was 0.000, less than the cut-off point of 0.05, confirming the validity of the 
construct [57]. Finally, the Kaiser-Mayer Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) test examines the scale 
sufficiency. The KMO value for the sample was 0.744, which was above the cut-off value of 0.5 [56].  
3-2- Measuring Optimism Bias 
For the purpose of simplification in the calculation of the bias score and data analysis in SPSS, the 28 delay causes 
were coded. S2P1: S2P28 codes (where S2 implies Section 2 and P1, the Probability of delay cause 1). S2P25- S2P28 
represented positive events as opposed to delay causes; as such, the signs of the scores were reversed, i.e. -3 becomes 
+3. The participants' bias score was obtained by summing the resulting scores for each delay cause and dividing the 
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result by the total number of delays in the questionnaire (28). A score < 0 indicates the presence of optimism bias, a 
score = 0 indicates no bias, and scores > 0 indicates pessimistic bias” [54]. The average respondents' bias score, the 
average root cause bias score and the average bias score of the positive outcomes were subsequently calculated. 
3-3- Demographics- Test of Statistical Significance (ANOVA and t-test)  
An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed to compare differences in optimism bias of sample means based 
on the demographics collected to determine whether the result is statistically significant at a 5% and 10 % confidence 
interval (p<0.05 and p< 0.1) [56, 58]. Assuming a null hypothesis that the population means are equal (no optimism 
bias), a one-way ANOVA test was carried out on the following independent variables: Age Group, job position, years’ 
experience; the dependent variable, in this case, was the respondent bias score (Optimism Bias, No Bias, Pessimistic). 
If there is a significant difference between the test sample, then the Least Significant Difference (LSD) Post Hoc test or 
Tamhane’s T2 Post Hoc for heterogenous was conducted to illustrate the variables that showed a significant difference 
between them. 
3-4- Relative Important Index (RII) 
The Relative Important Index (RII) is a popular and effective ranking technique used in construction research [59, 
60]. The RII values in this research assigned the first rank to the lowest value because delay causes indicate the strongest 
presence of optimism bias at the lowest RII score. Hence, the lower value of RII indicated an optimistic response towards 




                                                                                                                                                                            (1) 
Where:    = the weight assigned to the  
   option, which ranges from -5 to 5 within the Likert scale; H = the highest 
ranking available (i.e. 5 in this case); n = the total number of participants. 
4- Results and Discussion  
From the survey sample, 51% of the responses came from independent consultants (Engineers, project managers and 
quantity surveyors), 40% were engineers and project managers representing the client (public sector managers/ 
engineers), and 10% were private-sector contractors and construction academics. Table 2 shows the overall average bias 
scores obtained for each stakeholder. From the sampled population, participants displayed pessimism in their responses, 
with independent consultants experiencing the highest average bias score of 1.96 and public sector representatives of 
1.71. This means that participants acknowledge that there is a relatively high likelihood of delay occurrences in public 
sector projects they are involved in compared to similar private sector projects executed by their peers. Based on the 
pessimism bias expressed, it is inferred that participants are, in fact, aware of the causes of project delays and cost 
overrun and its occurrence under their management. 
Table 2. Average bias scores based on participants’ position. 
Participants current position Number of participants Overall average bias score  Positive outcome bias score  
Consultants 27 1.96 0.78 
Contractor 3 1.63 -2.25 
Client  21 1.71 -0.92 
Academics 2 1.23 1.50 
Participants were subsequently provided questions with positive outcomes, i.e. the probability of successfully 
completing a project within the planned schedule and budgeted costs and the probability of being awarded a contract 
without intentionally overestimating benefits and underestimating time and costs. It is observed that consultants and 
academics were consistent in their perception, maintaining a pessimistic bias score. However, both contractor and client 
groupings demonstrated the presence of optimism bias, with contractor’s representatives being more optimistic of 
achieving project success in terms of time and cost (-2.25) as compared to client’s representatives (-0.92). These findings 
compare favourably to a similar relationship put forward by Fischhoff, et al. [61], where individuals tend to be overly 
optimistic about the outcome of their own plan, justifying the planning fallacy concept. 
A similar pattern of pessimism was revealed for delay and cost overrun root cause groupings. The sample surveyed 
expressed a relatively high pessimistic bias score for technical root causes, followed by psychological, political and 
social, respectively, in that order. However, a neutral position was observed for the lack of either optimism or pessimism 
bias when presented with positive outcomes within the root cause groupings, as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Average bias score base on the delay factor grouping. 
Delay factor root cause groups Average bias score  
Political 2.17  
Technical 2.54  
Social 0.87  
Psychological 2.20  
Positive Outcome -0.04  
The Relative Importance Index (RII) values for each delay cause was calculated to ranked delay factors according 
to their bias scores. Table 4 summarises the ranking of each delay cause overall and within their root cause grouping.  
Based on the rank of the RII, participants tend to exert higher levels of optimism bias to social issues, followed by 
technical, political and finally psychological. Therefore, psychological root causes tend to possess the least relative 
importance among the sample project participants. Interestingly, the top four ranked factors were social delay causes. 
From the results, we can infer that project actors are highly sensitive to social and environmental issues and their 
influence on a project. In term, an extra cautious approach will be adopted in any risk mitigation strategy. For example, 
to prevent labour disputes and strikes, the project team will accept team members who may not have the necessary skill 
set for the particular position. A project manager will be optimistic that the learning curve of the new team member can 
be easily and quickly bridged, while the local content addition may not want to deliberately delay the learning process 
in an effort to lengthen the project and consequent longer employment status. Similarly, participants tend to express a 
higher level of optimism to social issues as compared to other root cause groupings, with “schedule disruption due to 
location” ranking first overall. 
Within the technical grouping, the top-ranked factors were “resource shortage” and “inclement weather”, while the 
last ranked factor is “payment delays/funding”. Participants therefore perceived projects are least likely to be influenced 
by shortages in material, equipment and labour, and seasonal weather patterns. On the other hand, delays and cost 
overruns are more likely to be experienced by payment and funding issues. Similarly, under political root cause, 
participants view “political interference” as least likely to influence projects compared to improper planning during the 
bidding stage. For psychological root cause, “short-term thinking and heuristics” had the highest optimism bias rank. 
Based on the findings, the optimistic responses of the participants were directly linked to several reasons given within 
the Commission of Enquiry [62] into construction projects in Trinidad and Tobago. To this date, the planning of public 
sector projects failed to identify delusion, deception and lack of funding as contributing factors to project delays. Plotch 
[33] observed a similar trait in absconding from responsibility when a report is submitted from one governing political 
party to another. However, a pessimistic score on payment delays and improper planning as a major contributing factor 
to delays in public sector projects [33, 37] suggests that decision-makers are aware of these issues. 





















Delay Cause RII  
 
    Social    
1 1 Schedule disruption due to location 0.101  
2 2 Environmental impacts and historic preservation 0.132  
3 3 Labour disputes, strikes, and protest 0.2  
4 4 Accidents, theft and vandalism 0.264  
    Technical    
1 5 Resource shortage 0.347  
1 5 Inclement weather 0.347  
3 11 Poor communication  0.393  
4 12 deficient site management/ supervision 0.415  
5 14 Under-measurement in the BOQ  0.426  
6 18 Delay in issuing design and drawings  0.513  
7 19 Design errors/ Omissions  0.517  
8 20 Design changes during construction 0.615  
8 20 Non-performance of the contractors  0.615  
10 23 Very slow response from utility agencies 0.683  
11 24 Payment delay/Lack of funding/ incentive scheme 0.717  
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    Political    
1 7 Political interference 0.353  
2 8 Low priority of project 0.37  
3 9 Manipulation of information & Bid rigging 0.385  
4 10 Hostile political conditions 0.389  
5 16 Contract modification/ Negotiation after contract award 0.468  
6 22 Improper planning during the bidding stage 0.638  
    Psychological    
1 13 Short-term thinking and Heuristics 0.419  
2 15 High level of uncertainty and raising false expectations 0.430  
3 17 Unrealistic estimating of tasks duration/ labour 0.472  
The results of the ANOVA test in Table 5 showed that all independent variables (age, position and experience) 
produced non-significant statistical results at a 5% significance level. This indicates that age group, position, and 
experience do not provide compelling statistical evidence of the optimism bias effect on the population. However, the 
independent variable “age group” (0.05<p≤ 0.099<0.1) and position (0.05<p≤0.066 < 0.1) implies marginal significance 
at a 10% significance [56, 58], suggesting there is weak evidence of optimism bias in the population. An independent 
samples t-Test was further conducted to determine if there was any significant difference between males and females 
on the Bias Scores obtained. From the results obtained, the 36 males had a mean bias score of -0.4028, and the 17 
females had a mean bias score of 0.7353 for the positive bias outcome. However, the results were not statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level (p≤ 0.163) [58]. Thus, there is little evidence of the effect optimism bias varies 
by gender in the population. Levene’s test for equality of variances further confirmed that the variance for males and 
females do not differ significantly from each other (p ≤ 0.267 and 0.428) as it relates to the bias score of the participants. 
A main limitations in the analysis was the relatively small sample size of 53 participants, which can affect the statistical 
significance of the results. However, since optimism bias is a relatively new concept to construction professionals in the 
Caribbean, deeper insights from the participants’ knowledge on this phenomenon were warranted. This was gathered by 
analysing responses given from open ended questions.  
Table 5. ANOVA comparison for the independent variables: "Age Group", "Position", and "Field Experience". 
  ANOVA (between groups)  
 Sum of squares df Mean Square F Sig.  
Age Group (Bias) 8.717 3 2.906 2.207 0.099  
Age Group (PBias) 64.528 3 1.317 2.060 0.118  
Position (Bias) 1.594 3 0.531 0.363 0.078  
Position (PBias) 53.591 3 17.864 2.559 0.066  
Experience (Bias) 6.807 3 2.269 1.674 0.185  
Experience (PBias) 51.043 3 17.014 2.419 0.077  
* Bias= Overall Optimism Bias of the group, PBias= Positive Optimism Bias of the group 
Section 3 of the questionnaire included four opened-ended questions to explore context-specific issues of the 
influence of optimism bias on delays and cost overruns, and more specifically, the participants' understanding of 
optimism bias. The first question was generic in nature, requesting participants to state their perception of the leading 
cause of cost overrun and recommendations to curtail this problem. Financial concerns, such as budgeted funding for 
the project, cash flows and payments, were of major concern. However, several descriptions had overlapping issues. 
Poor planning and strategy overlapped with strategic misrepresentation and financial concerns. 
The second question was specific, asking participants whether they heard of the term optimism bias. Not surprisingly, 
62% of the respondents have never heard of the term optimism bias. This lack of knowledge of optimism bias would 
have the propensity to skew the results obtained. Literature of optimism bias in construction is also non-existent in the 
Caribbean context and not taught in construction programmes. However, when provided with a definition as the 
"inclination for people to be overly positive when making predictions about the outcome of the future planned 
action”[7], and asking whether optimism bias exists in the planning stage of a construction project, 96% agreed 
optimism bias is indeed present among themselves as planners and decision-makers on public sector projects. Thus, by 
reframing the question and providing a definition of optimism bias, participants’ perceptions changed from negative 
(not knowing) to positive (high acceptance). This cognitive shift in perception underlies probing the effect of optimism 
bias. 
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Thus, the subsequent question probed into optimism bias effects, such as whether participants believe benefits are 
overestimated while project cost is underestimated. 85% of the participants agreed that benefits are overestimated and 
cost underestimated. Several rationales were provided, such as benefits stated on projects are not realistic but required, 
even necessary, to show social development and gain political support. Also, public sector acceptance is driven by the 
lowest costs; thus, project managers deliberately underestimate costs. Contractors deliberately underbid to ensure a 
project is given life and proceed with this optimism due to the lack of formal risk assessment scenarios. Several responses 
also suggested that ministries and state agencies are not concerned with the worst-case scenario; unforeseen items of 
work and detailed scope are left after contract award.  
The final question explored the issue of managerial failure to identify delay concerns during planning that could 
negatively impact productivity on construction projects. 94% of the respondents agreed that these delay causes are not 
identified by project managers, which leads to reoccurrence on other similar projects. Managers' dominant reason for 
these failed opportunistic behaviours is to improve their agency through favouritism in the award of contracts. 
Respondents agree that politics influence public sector construction contracts through distortion of scope, deliberate 
cost, and schedule manipulation, ultimately resulting in sizable cost overruns. A senior public sector manager stated: 
 “We need to distinguish between cost escalation (anticipated growth in a budgeted cost due to factors such as 
inflation) and cost overrun. I am inclined to believe that anything relating to cost estimates, bills of quantities, budgets 
etc., ought to be prepared by a Chartered Quantity Surveyor. In other words, being able to estimate the cost of an item/s 
remains key/critical to delivering a solid project plan. Hence, without extensive estimation skills, quantity surveyors 
usually find it somewhat difficult to provide accurate estimates.”   
Opposing views were also shared by 13% of the respondents, citing reputational impacts, as a contractor’s project 
manager suggested: 
“A seasoned contractor seldom makes errors with cost. As Project Manager, I have my pride and a reputation to 
maintain.” 
These findings are aligned to those in developed nations [24] and the Caribbean SIDS [28, 29], affirming that 
misinformation of a project’s cost, risk and benefits are more of a norm than an exception. The causal chain starts with 
misinformation by political influences. However, the project team is left to make the best of a subpar project. Their 
optimism to ensure project success masks the reality of the outcomes. While the technical team attempts to deliver such 
projects under constrained conditions and lacks awareness of the initial misinformation, it imposes unanticipated 
consequences. Scenarios are involuntarily generated to ensure the successful outcome of projects, while failure is 
ignored. Typical contingencies within the project’s contract are unable to be an effective control in mitigating these 
risks.  
Such over-optimism relates to delusions or honest mistakes and deliberate strategic deception, resulting in delays, 
cost overruns and benefit shortfalls [24]. Although both delusion and deception co-exist in projects [25], the strong 
presence of delusion or optimism bias can be accompanied by a weak presence of deception, such as strategic 
misrepresentation. Delusional optimism explains the performance of construction projects that appears to absolve the 
planner's responsibility [25]. Yet, when forecasters were asked about the possible causes of inaccurate information, they 
fail to mention the possibility of optimism as a causal factor [63]. The obvious explanation for this is that optimism bias 
is an unconscious form of delusion and therefore not explicitly reflected upon by individual forecasters [24]. Optimism 
bias is a powerful explanation of cost overrun and projects delays, and naïve planners and decision-makers, 62% of our 
sample, are systemically prone to repeat similar errors and oversights without learning from past experiences [24]. 
Unfortunately, the overwhelming weight of evidence in the literature revealed that experience planners and decision-
makers also fall prey to optimism bias.  
4-1- Proposed Mitigation Strategy to Curb Optimism Bias in Trinidad and Tobago Construction Sector 
Optimism bias is officially recognised as a risk in public sector projects in the United Kingdom through research and 
policy initiatives. Through the “The Green Book”, implemented by HM Treasury in 2003, optimism bias, together with 
uncertainty and risk, are identified under section A5 [9]. A mitigation strategy to curb cost overruns due to optimism 
bias is reference class forecasting (RCF). A Similar recommendation is made for Caribbean SIDS. Currently, public 
sector project professionals are not fully aware of the impacts of optimism bias. Implementing a government policy of 
recognising optimism bias and subjecting projects to RCF truer cost estimates on projects can be realised. Originally 
conceptualised by Kahneman [64] to report for the cognitive tendency found in forecasting by individuals, RCF involves 
analysing distributional data of similar and statistically meaningful classes of projects and taking “an outside view” 
position of the project. Using relevant and statistically meaningful project data, a probability distribution of the selected 
reference class is developed, and the specific project under evaluation is compared to the reference class distribution to 
determine the likely outcome [63]. The main limitation of this method is that it fails to forecast the possible outcome of 
projects lying outside the historical guides available for reference.  
Emerging Science Journal | Vol. 5, No. 4 
Page | 438 
Also, the “Contingency Time Window” (CTW) concept is a new system to be introduced into tenders in a similar 
manner as RCF. It is defined as an agreed duration within the contractual period reserved for the project’s use and its 
variables. Parties are not held liable for delays when the CTW period is enforced. Based on distributional data of delays, 
a CTW can be established for similar projects. For example, delays in public housing projects of similar size can be 
accounted for and placed in a reference class distribution. During tendering, the contractor will be requested to insert 
his planned schedule plus the CTW determined from the reference class. In the absence of distributional data, a 
reasonable time frame can be determined from a consensus or Delphi approach. The contingency window will further 
consider known-unknown risks, such as errors and omissions in the contract documents [65].  
From the survey conducted, 68% of the participants were in support of the development of a “time contingency 
window”, which can reduce inaccuracy and bias in the early planning stage. They believed that it could: 1. Improve the 
overall confidence of the project in a probabilistic sense, and 2. Provide enough time to prepare a fully coordinated value 
engineered design. On the other hand, 32% of the participants believed that the time contingency window could 
encourage the parties involved in the project to be complacent. Regardless of such opposing views, the implementation 
of CTW can improve project control and accountability, directly reducing delays and, ultimately, cost overruns on public 
sector projects.  
5- Conclusions  
On public sector construction projects in the Caribbean, optimism bias is not recognised. The construction industry 
makes a scant effort to quantify the degree of optimism expressed by project planners and decision-makers. This 
research's primary contribution was the development of such strategies to close this gap. To measure the level of 
optimism bias among construction professionals, Breakwell et al. [54] method was adopted and modified within the 
context of the Caribbean SIDS construction industry by assigning bias scores to delay causes. Following that, delay 
causes were ranked using RII based on the participants' bias scores. The reliability and validity tests established the 
questionnaire's appropriateness use for this study. 
When asked about the likelihood of the effect of optimism bias on delay causes occurring on a project, the ANOVA 
test revealed marginal statistical significance among the age groups. Similarly, the participants' position and field 
experience were marginally significant concerning their positive bias score (i.e. scores obtained from the probability of 
positive outcomes). The study also found that the results were constrained by the values chosen for the dependent list 
and the small sample size. It is critical to use the actual bias score obtained by the participants rather than a value-label 
system when selecting such data for analysis. From the results obtained, contractors and project managers revealed a 
higher degree of optimism bias as it relates to a project experiencing delays and cost overrun during its duration. This 
finding answers the research question that there is optimism in the execution of projects which is not accounted for by 
planners and decision-makers. The limitation here is that the bias score was influenced by the outcome provided. The 
positive outcomes provided to the participants produce a higher optimism bias. It is, therefore, recommended that an 
equal distribution of positive and negative outcomes be presented for future research. In capturing the amount of bias 
amongst project managers and decision-makers, negative outcomes of real-life scenarios which are experienced on the 
construction site can be used.  
The main optimistic delay factors were identified as 1. Disruption to the contractor's schedule because of location 2. 
Environmental impacts and historic preservation 3. Labour disputes, strikes, and protests, and 4. Accidents, theft and 
vandalism. However, the most pessimistic factors were. 1. Payment delays, 2. Slow response from utility agencies, and 
3. Improper planning during the bidding stage. The open responses by the participants further confirmed that a lack of 
funding and poor planning are major contributing factors to project delays. They further admitted a lack of awareness 
of optimism bias and the practice of strategically manipulating the true cost of a project by underestimating the budget 
in an attempt to gain project and contract approval. Therefore, such delusion and deception need to be addressed in all 
forms to ensure effective and efficient usage of taxpayer’s monies. It is therefore proposed that a contingency “time 
window” be introduced within contractual documentation to reduce the reoccurring and resistant nature of these delays 
due to optimism bias and ensure reasonable and realistic expectations are established. Further research into contingency 
time windows is recommended. 
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